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Book Reviews
RICHARD H. BROWN, Editor-in-Charge.

Barnes' Federal Code. Edited byJ Uriah Barnes. Henry Craig
Jones and Ira E. Robinson, Associate Editors. Virginian Law
Book Company, Charleston and The Bobbs-Merrill Company,
Indianapolis.

1919.

pp. civ, 2831.

Barnes' Federal Code is a handy edition of the federal statutes of a
public and general nature, revised to date. It is the only revision in a
single volume, and the only one of any character since 1916. The book
is neat, and in appearance and mechanical detail might well pass for
a de luxe edition.
The statutes now in force are classified according to subject matter,
on the basis of the Revised Statutes and Statutes at Large, but the
order of treatment of these subjects is more like that in the United
States Compiled Statutes. The sections are given serial numbers, but
at the end of each section are references to the original and amendatory acts, and to the corresponding sections in the Statutes at Large
and Revised Statutes, if they appear therein. There are a number of
tables which further aid in the finding of statutes printed elsewhere.
In a Parallel Reference Table are arranged in three parallel columns
the serial sections of this compilation, the volume and page of the
same matter in the Federal Statutes Annotated (2d ed.), and the
corresponding section numbers in the United States Compiled Statutes. A Table of Statutes gives in the first column the section numbers in the Revised Statutes, and in a parallel column the section
numbers of this compilation. This table is brought down to date by
an arrangement of the laws since 1874 in chronological order, placing
under each year, in parallel columns, the day of enactment, the chapter and section of the original law, the volume and page of its inclusion
in the Statutes at Large, and its serial section in this compilation.
The Judicial and Criminal Codes have separate parallel column references to the sections in Barnes' Code. There is still another table of
important acts by their popular names, such as the Mann Act, the
Webb-Kenyon Act, the Hepburn Act, etc. The statutes are also very
thoroughly indexed, the index appearing to be a decided improvement
over most indexes in works of this type.
Throughout the compilation appear many valuable historical and
explanatory notes. The Declaration of Independence, the Articles of
Confederation, the Northwest Territorial Government Ordinance, and
the Constitution of the United States, with its seventeen amendments,
are also included.
The editorial work shows care, skill and scholarship.
0. L. McCaskill.
Constitutional Power and World Affairs. By George Sutherland.
Columbia University Lectures on the George Blumenthal Foundation for 1918. Columbia University Press, New York. 1919.
pp. vii, 202.

The book consists of eight chapters or lectures devoted to a study of
the Constitution of the United States with reference to the powers of
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external sovereignty as distinguished from the powers of internal
sovereignty of the national government. It is admitted that the
powers of internal sovereignty are subject to limitations, but the contention of the author is that "we must be able to assert and maintain
for that government the unimpaired powers of complete external
sovereignty. * * * The complete powers of the governments of
other nations must be matched by the complete powers of our own
government.

*

*

*

Our government must come to its new tasks

not only with full, but with unquestioned powers."
In the course of the development of this theme the author discusses
The Great War-Democracyandthe Constitution; The Powersof the
National Government; The External Powers-Extent and Limitations; The War Powers-Nature, Basis and Distribution; The War
Powers-Extent and Limitations; The Treaty-Making PowerGeneral; The Treaty-Making Power-How Far Limited; and After
the War.
Although the chapters on the Treaty-Making Power cover ground
already covered by innumerable papers and books of the last fifteen
years they may still be said to be among the best in the book and they
serve clearly to illustrate the author's point of view. No competent
student of public affairs has risen to deny that in treaty-making the
national government has full powers, although states have found
reason to protest against some of the practical results of treaties, but
the author's treatment of the matter is clear, satisfactory, and at
times learned. The chapters on the War Powers likewise deserve
favorable comment and it is possible that they may have interest for
even the casual reader.
Other chapters, notably the opening and closing chapters, are less
satisfactory. They are of the expansive type of utterance so commonly heard in Congress, and they are not so convincing as those
devoted to legal and historical treatment of constitutional matters.
Throughout the entire book there is a considerable lack of understanding as to what readers may be expected to know about the Constitution, about the Constitutional History of the United States, and
about political theory in general. The ex-Senator has the customary
stock of History and Political Science of the lawyer of the old school
and much that he labors with so painfully is neatly disposed of by the
average collegian in three lines.
Perhaps the most gratifying thing about the book is the evidence of
constant and careful attention to matters of this sort during a Senatorial career of considerable length. There are abundant signs of real
application to the materials of our history. One can not fail to find a
certain encouragement in this fact.
Julian P. Bretz.
The Development of German Prize Law. By Charles Henry Huberich and Richard King. Baker, Voorhis & Company, New York.
1918.

pp. 6i.

This is in the main a reprint of an article which appeared in the
Columbia Law Review, June, 1918. The pamphlet is not a historical
treatise as the name might imply, but simply brings down to date an
earlier work of the same authors, "The Prize Code of the German
Empire" as in force July 1, 1915.
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The purpose of the study, as stated by the authors, is the consideration of some of the more important decisions of the German Prize
Courts substantially in the order of the articles of the Prize Code. The
Prize Code follows the order of presentation of the Declaration of
London and an attempt was evidently made to incorporate the main
provisions of the Declaration into the Code. Proclamations relating
to submarine warfare are not discussed for these are considered as
purely military and political in their nature.
Is the Prize Code itself a law or is it merely a set of instructions to
naval commanders? In the light of court decisions and legal authorities the conclusion is reached that it has in part the force of substantive law, while certain articles are clearly in the nature of instructions
to commanders.
The law administered by German Prize Courts is municipal law
even if in conflict with the principles of international law. This, however, is not peculiar to Germany. Prize courts are national courts
functioning as directed by the customs, statutes or special regulations
of their state; but in some states the courts exercise greater discretion
than in others in deciding such cases.
The jurisdiction of German Prize Courts is more limited than that
of the English. Seizure, or at least an intent to seize, as a prize, a
neutral or enemy vessel or cargo is considered essential to confer jurisdiction. Jurisdiction does not extend to enemy goods on German
vessels, nor to German vessels engaged in prohibited commerce or in
aiding the enemy, nor to German goods on board any vessel, nor to
public vessels of any state. Capture is in general made by war vessels, but may also be made by land forces or by port authorities.
Under the heading Enemy Destination it is interesting to note that
in the Ordinance of April iS, 1915, is found the beginning of the

adoption of the doctrine of continuous voyages in the case of conditional contraband and that later this doctrine was materially extended
so that the burden of proof came to rest on the claimant to show innocent destination. In all cases it is the destination of the cargo and not
of the vessel that is regarded as material.
The Prize Code followed the Declaration of London in its provisions
concerning Unneutral Service, but later ordinances made radical
changes.

The Ordinance of April 24,

1918,

provided that unless the

facts show the contrary, a neutral vessel shall be regardedas navigating in the interest of enemy warfare, if the state whose flag the vessel
is entitled to fly has concluded an agreement with an enemy state
respecting the use of cargo space, or if the greater part of the merchant
marine of the neutral state in active service is navigating on behalf of
the enemy.
German Prize Courts allowed no compensation to neutral owners
for property on board destroyed prizes if the destruction was held
justifiable. The code permits destruction if the bringing in of the
vessel appears to the commander to be inappropriate or unsafe. Cases
of vessels and cargoes sunk by submarine would of course not come
within the jurisdiction of the Prize Court, as has already been noted.
The authors have made good use of German source material which
has not been generally available and have presented the results of
their study in compact and systematic form. These results will
undoubtedly be incorporated in a revision of the earlier volume.
R. S. Saby.
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A Treatise on the Law of Public Service Companies. By Needham C.
Collier. The F. H. Thomas Law Book Co., St. Louis. 1918.
pp. xvi, 727.
We have in this book a most confused mixture of material, entirely
innocent of scientific arrangement, and giving no evidence of scholarship. The author seems ignorant of the history of common callings,
and quite oblivious of the part played in the law of public service by
the grant and receipt of franchises. Furthermore, he asserts that
police power "confers no right to fix rates" (p. 187). His chapter on
"Valuation in Rate Making" is fairly typical of the whole book. It
covers only fourteen pages. It contains no discussion of the advantages of measuring value by cost of reproduction less depreciation,
over the advantages of measuring value by original investment; or
of the proper method of valuing land; or of the proper treatment of
appreciation, piecemeal construction and cost of engineering and promotion; or of the propriety of giving a value to franchises for rate
purposes. The chapter contains a section on "going value," which,
the author concludes, "if not good will is nevertheless in the nature of
goodwill." (p.324.)
The English in the book is careless, and throughout the sentences
are confused and awkward. A few instances picked at random will
suffice as illustrations: "Society is so constituted that some of its
members in pursuing their avocations [sic], need the special use of
facilities which are intended for the equal advantage of all." (p. i.)
(See also twelfth line, p. 185.) "Common rights in trade and traffic
is one thing. Common rights in what belongs to the public is
another." (p. 37.) "At present consideration is confined to what were
deemed public landings at common law. These were places to which
access was had by reason of their relation to the navigable waters of
the British realm. They were places in its public ports, to establish
which it was the prerogative of the King." (p. 35.) "The fact that
this is the creation of a monopoly, and, therefore, a business which
enjoys a monopoly which is affected with a public use, it is not a monopoly in the sense spoken of in the Case of Monopolies." (p. 39.) "To
be more precise as to the beginning of this development reference is
made to the Munn case decided in 1876. This case and another,
decided in 1913, is, as said in a dissent by Justice Lamar, concurred in
by the Chief Justice and Justice Van Devanter, a 'land mark in the
law * * *'." (p. X82.) "The right has so to speak, been woven
into our system, as we inherited that from our common law origin.
Its adoption [sic] to our new conditions has passed beyond theory and
has become a part of our legislative and practical experience." (p. 243.)
"It is shown that the majority of the English opinion and two American cases that the principle of reasonableness of charge does not compel the conclusion that this means equality of charge. But independently of statutory regulation this has been derived. The effect
of the state taking over regulation is to commission a public service
company to perform a public duty. It is clothed like a public officer
to execute the law with absolute impartiality for all." (p. 298.)
The book contains an appendix of over two hundred pages containing the procedural parts of the commission laws of the various states,
annotated.
C.K.B.

